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The Standard of Injury
in the Resolution of
Antidumping Disputes
EDWARD J. KRAULAND
When a private party files a dumping complaint, the
Antidumping Act of 19211 provides a two-step procedure for examin-
ing an alleged infraction by a foreign exporter. First, the Department
of the Treasury must determine if imports are being marketed within
the United States at less than fair value (hereinafter LTFV). If Trea-
sury makes an affirmative determination, the International Trade
Commission (ITC) must then determine if a United States industry is
being injured, is likely to be injured, or is prevented from being es-
tablished by reason of the LTFV sales. If any of these forms of injury
is found, an antidumping duty equal to the margin of dumping (as
determined by Treasury) is levied on the imported LTFV goods.
Because of the lack of statutory guidance in defining or interpret-
ing the terms "industry" or "injury," the ITC has had to define them
on a case-by-case basis. The decisions have varied with changes in
the makeup of the ITC and with the American political and economic
climate, as well as with intangible variables unique to particular
cases. As a result, the body of law that has emerged does not fit
easily into a system of decisions. Academicians and practitioners
alike have expressed a desire for a coherent body of law upon which
they can rely with certainty. Yet they approach the quest for a con-
crete, reliable standard of injury for antidumping disputes with am-
bivalence: at best, the quest will produce only guidelines for the in-
terested parties; at worst, the quest might confirm the suspicion that
no consistent standard exists. While the following analysis of the
injury standard does not purport to outline a cohesive set of doctrines
applied by the ITC in those cases, it does seek to identify and evalu-
ate some of the factors that the Commission finds important in mak-
ing its case-by-case determinations.
Edward J. Krauland is a member of the class of 1980, University of Michigan
Law School.
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THE DETERMINATION OF INJURY
Before the ITC can determine whether there has been injury, the
Commission must define the scope of the affected industry. Former
Commissioner Clubb candidly stated that, "The scope of the term
'industry' is flexible and depends heavily upon why the inquiry is
being made."
'2
"Industry" typically has been interpreted as being national rather
than local in scope. 3 The strong policy justification for this interpre-
tation is that a narrower, more local definition of "industry" would
permit a few marginal companies to use the Act for protectionist
purposes at the cost of a more beneficial, liberal trade policy.
4
Within this national concept of industry, the Commission has used
two separate tests for defining the scope of the particular industry
affected-competing products and geographic boundaries. Appar-
ently, the Commission may look at either, in its discretion. In ex-
plaining the competing product test, the Commission has held that a
domestic product competes with the imported product if it is either
identical with, 5 or substantially comparable to, the latter.6 However,
it has been noted that "the Commission has not scrutinized carefully
the cross-elasticity of demand between domestic products"7 in deter-
mining the relevant industrial market.
As for the geographical boundary test, the Commission has defined
industry so as to account for the national output of the article being
examined. 8 Thus, the industry could be either a single firm that hap-
pens to be the exclusive producer of a product,9 or a group of firms
across the country which account for almost all domestic produc-
tion.'0 At the same time, the Commission has been reluctant to ex-
pand the scope of the market beyond the borders of the United
States. In Potassium Chloride from Canada, France, and West Ger-
many," the Commission expressly rejected respondent's contention
that the relevant industry encompassed all of North America, and
nqt the United States alone. It appears that if a transnational market
d~knition were employed, several LTFV imports which would nor-
mlly be found injurious would be exempt from antidumping duties
on the basis that the entire industry technically was multinational in
scone, thereby dissipating the injury.'
2
Although it has rejected attempts to define the relevant industry as
transnational in scope, the Commission has been willing to define a
regional market. In its 1955 Cast Iron Soil Pipe from the United
Kingdom decision, the Commission made its first steps in this direc-
tion, defining the relevant industrial market as the state of Califor-
nia.' 3 If an article is heavy, of low value, and cannot be economically
transported out of a limited geographic area, and particularly if the
affected producers have historically served only a limited territory,'
4
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the Commission is likely to narrow the definition of industry to that
same geographic area. 15 With such evidence before it, the ITC is
more willing to "segmentize" the industry so as to afford protection
to those firms whose marketing power is constrained by physical and
economic considerations. 
16
The Commission has gradually and consistently expanded its use
of the regional industry theory. 17 In the 1964 case of Chromic Acid
from Australia,18 the Commission focused on the West Coast market
for chromic acid and found injury to the domestic industry where
"there is rapid penetration of a major market area with a substantial
capture of a major 'share' of that market."'19 In 1970, the Commis-
sion further expanded the regional market concept by stating that
"an injury to a part of the national industry is an injury to the whole
industry. '20 In the 1973 Steel Wire Rope from Japan case,2' the Com-
mission narrowly focused on a regional market, in part by segment-
ing the industry and examining the small region created thereby.
The Commission found that LTFV sales into the Pacific Northwest,
Pacific Southwest, and south central regions of the United States
were of sufficient magnitude to cause injury to the entire United
States industry. And in the 1978 Portland Hydraulic Cement from
Canada22 decision, Commissioners Bedell, Ablondi, Alberger and
Moore stated that the regional market approach is applicable "where
(1) domestic producers of an article are located regionally and serve
a particular regional market predominantly or exclusively, and (2)
the LTFV imports are concentrated primarily in the regional mar-
ket." According to this determination, the LTFV sales were directed
toward :the Northeast United States, and therefore the relevant mar-
ket was limited to that region. However, Commissioner Alberger
qualified his general endorsement of the test with the statement that
general economic conditions (in this case, shortages of cement in
other parts of the country) may dictate that the regional market ap-
proach not be used.
The Commission has also stated that elements of injury in more
than one industry can be aggregated for purposes of finding a signifi-
cant injury warranting imposition of an antidumping duty. In Lock-
In Amplifiers and Parts Thereof from the United Kingdom, the ITC
focused on the Act's language, and concluded that:
The use of the indefinite article "an", rather than the definite
article "the" allows the Commission to examine the impact of
LTFV sales on more than one industry, if it deems such course
of action is appropriate.
23
The practical effect of this innovative technique has yet to be de-
termined. The decision may be limited to cases involving competitive
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product-lines where sufficient data concerning the relative degrees
of injury to each related industry is not available.
24
Like the term "industry," "injury" is not defined in the Act. There-
fore, the injury standard has evolved and changed throughout the
history of the Act's administration and implementation. It has been
noted that the Act's legislative history indicates that Congress did
not intend that a business be near extinction before injury could be
found. In fact, in 1951 the House Ways and Means Committee re-
jected a legislative proposal which would have required a finding of
material injury in order to impose an antidumping duty.25
Yet the Commission quickly seized upon the material injury stan-
dard embodied in Article VI of the GATT in administering the Act.
26
The Commission also established early that LTFV sales were not
considered presumptive of injury, but were condemned only when
they had an anticompetitive effect on a United States industry.
27
This posture apparently changed in 1967 when the Commission
announced a new de minimis standard for injury determinations:
"The word 'injury' in the Antidumping Act has been construed by the
Commission as meaning 'material injury.' Any injury which is more
than de minimis is material injury. '28 The Commission went on to
say that injury should be found whenever the "competition is direct,
and the price is unfair.
'29
In Animal Glue and Inedible Gelatin from Yugoslavia, Sweden,
the Netherlands, and West Germany, Commissioner Parker quoted
language from the Senate Report on the 1974 Trade Reform Act:
The term "injury," which is unqualified by adjectives such as
"material" or "serious," has been consistently interpreted by the
Commission as being that degree of injury which the law will
recognize and take into account.... Injury must be a harm
which is more than frivolous, inconsequential, insignificant or
immaterial. 30
It is not at all clear that the de minimis standard marks a radical
departure from previous decisions under the "material injury" test.
In a unanimous decision, Metal Punching Machines from Japan,
the Commission did not find injury, noting:
Market disruption, as cited by the Commission in conjunction
with its determinations under the Antidumping Act, is a wide-
embracing term applied to circumstances of extreme market be-
havior. Such behavior could consist of abnormal price declines,
market uncertainty including the departure of firms from the
market place, and unusually rapid market penetration. 3'
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The Commission has ruled that LTFV imports from several coun-
tries can be considered cumulatively. In Potassium Chloride from
Canada, France, and West Germany, the Commission found injury:
[A]n industry can be as much injured by small amounts of
LTFV imports from many different sources as it can be by the
same total amount from one source. Accordingly, for purposes
of making the injury determination, the source of the imports is
not important. It is their combined effect on the domestic indus-
try which controls.
32
Commissioner Moore relied on this language in finding injury in Pri-
mary Lead Metalfrom Canada.33 InAnimal Glue and Inedible Gela-
tin from Yugoslavia, Sweden, the Netherlands, and West Germany,
34
the Commission articulated several factors which may compel a cu-
mulative injury determination. The majority of the Commission
decided to cumulate the various imports since they were "generally
comparable in quality and price and were generally distributed
throughout the United States." Moreover, in this particular case, the
United States importers received shipments of the LTFV material
from various countries before reselling it to United States customers.
Several factors lead the Commission to a finding of injury. In any
particular case where injury is found, several of these indicia of
harm may be present.
Predatory Intent
Predatory intent has often been cited by the Commission as one fac-
tor which may lead to a finding of injury when it is combined with
some other evidence of competitive harm.35 Predatory intent may be
inferred where an exporter has either both the capacity and induce-
ment to sell at LTFV or a persistent tendency to operate at full capac-
ity and to export excess production at LTFV.36 Furthermore, cases
involving a second alleged instance of dumping by the same foreign
producer may lead to a finding of predatory intent.37 Conversely, the
Commission has stated that a demonstrated willingness to revise
prices and cooperate with Treasury authorities to avoid future LTFV
sales works to rebut allegations of predatory intent.
38
Price Depression or Suppression
Price depression occurs when LTFV importers undersell domestic pro-
ducers, forcing those domestic producers to lower their prices to meet
the competition. Price suppression occurs where the LTFV sales
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prevent domestic producers from increasing their prices in accor-
dance with rising costs or other factors which would justify price in-
creases. 39 One indication often used by the Commission to find price
suppression (or depression) is evidence of raw material price in-
creases without appropriate or corresponding finished price in-
creases. 40 A price level reduction of a few percentage points can suf-
fice to establish injury to a United States industry.
4'
On the other hand, evidence of a relative increase in the price of a
competitive good, when compared to a general price index (such as
the Consumer Price Index or a particular wholesale price index for-
mulated by a government agency), will tend to negate the charge of
price suppression or depression.42 Furthermore, if United States do-
mestic prices are below LTFV import prices to begin with, the Com-
mission may refuse to find a sufficient causal relationship between
LTFV sales and changes in domestic prices.
43
Market Penetration or Lost Sales
In cases where some market penetration or lost sales are attributable
to LTFV sales, the Commission is likely to find injury to a domestic
industry.4 4 The threshold of market penetration or lost sales needed
to trigger an injury determination cannot be generally defined. In
some instances, the Commission will find that a seemingly miniscule
degree of market penetration will suffice for an injury determination;
at other times, a considerable showing of market penetration will not
warrant a finding of injury.
45
For example, in Steel Bars, Reinforcing Bars and Shapes from
Australia,46 the Commission found injury to the industry when mar-
ket penetration was measured at 5.5 percent. More recently, however,
in Portable Electric Typewriters from Japan, the Commission found
that the United States industry was not being injured despite the fact
that LTFV sales had captured a large share of the domestic market.
It is acknowledged that imports of portable electric typewriters
from Japan, sold at LTFV, obtained a significant share of the
U.S. market for portable typewriters during the period of the
Treasury investigation.... However, import penetration alone
is not an adequate basis for determining injury.
47
The Commission took particular note of the fact that all the other
tests for injury indicated a healthy growth in the complainant's busi-
ness-prices were up and production and shipments had increased
despite the market intrusion. Therefore, a significant degree of mar-
ket penetration, without some other form of injury, may not compel
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the Commission to make an injury determination for purposes of
imposing an antidumping duty.
It should be noted that a small degree of market penetration by
LTFV sales may be the basis for a finding of no injury for two rea-
sons. If loss of sales is the only injury sustained, that injury may be
perceived as de minimis. But more importantly a small degree of
market penetration may indicate a lack of causation. If the com-
plainant argues that there were other injuries resulting from the loss
of sales (e.g. price suppression), the ITC may simply refuse to believe
that such a small degree of market penetration could cause those
other harms. In Butadiene Acrylonitrile Rubber from Japan, the
Commission found the degree of market penetration to be approxi-
mately 1 percent. The decision noted that, "In light of such a low
import penetration, it is difficult ... to tie LTFV imports to any in-
jury which may be occurring in the industry in question.
'48
Recently the Commission has expressed its findings of no signifi-
cant market penetration in somewhat different terms-the volume of
LTFV imports has been examined in light of the entire import vol-
ume from all foreign territories. As early as 1963, the Commission
considered injury to be related to the "ratio of aggregate imports
from LTFV countries to imports from all countries. '49 This concept
was invoked again in Steel Wire Strand for Prestressed Concrete
from India,50 where the Commission noted that the market penetra-
tion of Indian imports, relative to imports from other countries, was
very small. This marks a slight departure from the former practice of
narrowly focusing on the amount of importation from a specific
country and its significance in the United States domestic consump-
tive market alone. It represents a subtle move toward a more liberal
approach to antidumping actions and a more cautious attitude in
injury determinations.
An allegation of injurious market penetration may be rebutted by
showing that increased LTFV exports are taking sales away from
other foreign exporters rather than from American producers. In
Standard Household Incandescent Lamps from Hungary,51 the
Commission noted that the market share of Hungary's exports in-
creased from 16 percent to 59 percent in three years; however, "...
this increase in market share displaced other imports, not domestic
producers. '5 2 The Commission recognized that the United States pro-
ducers' share of the domestic market increased by 6 percent during
the same period.5 3 On the other hand, where apparent domestic con-
sumption increases, yet sales by domestic producers decrease, the
Commission has shown a tendency to find injury, taking such evi-
dence as a type of prima facie proof of market penetration and
injury.
5 4
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United States producers commonly complain that LTFV imports
result in the under-utilization of domestic productive facilities,
wasteful idle capacity, and an eventual increase in unemployment.
While the Commission has taken note of these economic ills, particu-
larly in times of persistently high employment, it has focused its
attention on the requirement that the imports actually cause the do-
mestic industry's problems. 55 In Sorbates from Japan,56 the com-
plainant could not demonstrate that its lagging capacity utilization
was less than it had expected when it began operations. In Knitting
Machines for Ladies Seamless Hosiery from Italy,57 the Commission
refused to make an affirmative determination of injury since the
alleged harm resulted from the complainant's own marketing fail-
ures. Similarly, the Commission has cited increased productivity as
the cause of decreased employment in the complainant's industry,
even during a period of LTFV sales.58
Typically, the Commission will look to increasing inventories as
evidence of idle capacity and injury to a domestic industry.59 How-
ever, the complainant must clearly demonstrate that such inventory
increases were not part of a purposeful marketing program.60
Decrease in Net Operating Profits and the LTFV Margin
The Commission has been sensitive in recent decisions to the compar-
ative profitability of the complainant firm during the period of LTFV
sales and other sales periods.61 Moreover, in instances where the
margin of dumping is pronounced, the Commission will rely heavily
upon the net profitability figures if there is evidence of some other
type of injury.
62
How these factors interrelate presents a complex calculus which
may be beyond empirical proof. Proof of lost sales or harmful price
depression attributable to LTFV imports can be quite compelling to
the ITC. Significant market penetration combined with an adverse
impact on domestic price level can often lead to an injury determina-
tion. Similarly, a small degree of market penetration with evidence
of predatory intent may lead to a finding of injury.63 On the other
hand, if the industry as a whole is operating near full capacity and
enjoying increased profits, the fact that a few scattered firms have
lost sales to import competition may not, without more, be sufficient
to demonstrate injury. 64
It appears that causation is becoming a more important factor in
the Commission's injury determinations. Earlier decisions did not
closely examine the necessary causal link between LTFV sales and
injuries, but recent ITC decisions indicate an increasing concern
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with causation and the necessity for a clear link. Discussions of
causation are not uniform; several Commissioners have interpreted
the causation requirement very loosely, while others have de-
manded a substantial causal link between LTFV sales and the al-
leged harm.
In Melamine in Crystal Form from Japan, Commissioner Parker
summarized what appears to be the current causation standard:
the law does not contemplate that injury from less-than-fair-
value imports be weighted against other factors which may be
contributing to injury to an industry. The words "by reason of"
express a causation link but do not mean that dumped imports
must be a (or the) principal cause, a (or the) major cause, or a
(or the) substantial cause of injury caused by all factors contrib-
uting to overall injury to an industry.
In short, the Committee does not view injury caused by unfair
competition, such as dumping, to require as strong a causation
link to imports as would be required for determining the exis-
tence of injury under fair trade conditions.
6 5
On the other hand, United States importers and foreign exporters
have been able to impress upon some members of the Commission
the importance of a stricter causation requirement. Commissioners
Ablondi, Alberger, and Minchew have consistently refused to find
injury where the causation link was tenuous, even if the link met the
looser standard of other commissioners. 66 And in instances of limited
injury to a single United States firm, the causation requirement may
be more strictly interpreted. In Welt Work Shoes from Romania, the
Commission accepted evidence that one firm had suffered losses dur-
ing the LTFV period, but stated that the "loss, in our opinion, is not
attributable solely to welt work shoe imports from Romania. ' '67 This
is one of the few instances where the Commission apparently re-
quired that the LTFV sales be the cause of the injury, rather than the
usual requirement that LTFV sales be a cause of injury.
One of the more frequently cited factors which has led the Com-
mission to findings of no injury has been the generally poor economic
health of the industry or nation as a whole. (This is somewhat coinci-
dent with the use of falling United States consumption to rebut an
allegation of injury from LTFV sales.) In Iron and Sponge Iron
Powders from Canada,68 the Commission took notice of the de-
pressed state of the United States economy in 1970-72 as a possible
explanation for the economic harm to domestic producers. A year
later, in a unanimous negative decision, the Commission again noted
that the economic recession of 1974-75 and a decrease in federal
funding for research led to a decrease in amplifier production.
69
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At the same time, the depressed state of the United States economy
may not, in itself, provide a defense to dumping charges. In fact, a
defense based on allegations of economic recession as the cause of
the alleged injury can often act as a two-edged sword, and work to
the disadvantage of a foreign producer or United States importer
charged with dumping articles at LTFV. For example, in Acrylic
Sheet from Japan, the Commission determined that the
increase in LTFV imports clearly exacerbated the injury that
the U.S. industry was already experiencing as a result of the
economic recession .... It is recognized that in 1975 the domes-
tic acrylic sheet industry was suffering from the economic re-
cession. Therefore, the presence of LTFV imports and offers of
large quantities of LTFV imports served to aggravate the injury
caused by the recession. LTFV imports have an even greater
impact under these conditions.
70
The same reasoning is found in Melamine in Crystal Form from
Japan,71 where the Commission used the United States recession as
a further justification for finding Japanese LTFV imports more inju-
rious than in a healthy economic period. And in Rayon Staple Fiber
from Belgium, injury was found again with the Commission empha-
sizing that "in a declining or stagnant market which existed in 1977,
increased import penetration was gained almost entirely at the ex-
pense of the domestic industry.
'7 2
These seemingly different results indicate that "economic reces-
sion" is not a talisman; it is not conclusive in either direction. Rather,
economic recession appears to raise doubts in the minds of the Com-
missioners about causation. Those doubts have been overcome, and
the Commission has found that the injury was caused by LTFV sales
rather than by economic recession, when the LTFV import activity
was most blatant-with high LTFV margins, significant market pene-
tration, and substantial underselling of United Statds domestic prices.
In such cases the Commission appears to almost assume predatory
intent, and predatory dumping is virtually aper se violation of the Act.
The seller's argument that the injury was in fact caused by economic
recession is therefore unavailing. When the seller's intent was clearly
nonpredatory, as when there is evidence that United States con-
sumers solicited increased foreign imports (including some at LTFV
prices) in order to assure themselves a stable source of supply, the
Commission will find the economic recessionary impact a sufficient
intervening cause negating an injury determination. 73
Apart from this increased concern with the general economic cli-
mate of the country, the Commission has stintingly come to recog-
nize that product differentiation or better service may result in price
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differentials that provide legitimate competition to United States pro-
ducers. In Metal-Punching Machines from Japan, the Commission
unanimously determined that LTFV sales had not injured American
industry. The decision noted that:
[t]he small penetration that has occurred since 1970 and the
lost sales which might be associated with it could be regarded
as injurious; however, the domestic sales were lost not "by rea-
son of" (i.e., the second requirement of the statute) the LTFV
nature of the imports, but rather because of the superior deliv-
ery schedules offered by the importer. . . [The shortened deliv-
ery times of Japanese models] weighed heavily in the pur-
chasers' decision to acquire the Japanese machine.
74
The Commission has used consumer questionnaires to find out why
customers chose to import the goods in question. In Railway Track
Maintenance Equipment from Austria,7 5 Commissioners Minchew
and Ablondi dissented from a finding of injury, noting that United
States producers preferred the Austrian imports for their durability,
reliability, low maintenance costs, and performance characteristics.
76
Although such data is not compelling since the Commission majority
has tended to interpret loosely the causation requirement, a 1978unan-
imous decision of no injury emphasized that factors other than price
attracted United States customers toward the LTFV articles.
77
Even though there may be no present injury attributable to LTFV
sales, the Commission may find that there is a "likelihood of in-
jury." One commentator has noted the nebulous nature of this de-
termination:
On the issue of likelihood of future injury, the standards used by
the Commission are less clear, although neither imminent in-
jury nor a reasonable likelihood appear to be required. The
Commission usually evaluates the attitude of the foreign pro-
ducers and their capacity and motivation to dump in the U.S.
market.
78
A determination of likelihood of injury appears to be proper where
the exporter under investigation has the economic incentive and ca-
pacity to maintain LTFV exports, and where such continuing exports
will result in a more than de minimis injury to a United States indus-
try.79 Almost by necessity, this determination requires some evalua-
tion of the intent of the exporter. In Primary Lead Metal from Aus-
tralia and Canada,80 the Commission found a likelihood of injury on
the basis of the substantial dumping margins which indicated the
exporter's willingness to undersell United States producers.81 In
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Metal Walled Swimming Pools from Japan,8 2 the Commission found
a likelihood of injury, emphasizing, among other things, that the
Japanese exporter had the capacity to continue production and ex-
ports of swimming pools with its existing facilities. Similarly, in
Steel Reinforcing Bars from Canada,8 the Commission enumerated
several factors which led it to find a likelihood of injury. Among
these were: continuance of imports at LTFV, wide dumping margins,
existence of a confidential contractual relationship between the for-
eign producer and the importer, and the ease with which the foreign
producer could increase his production.
8 4
Perhaps the Commission's tendency to evaluate the subjective in-
tent of the foreign producer in "likelihood of injury" cases is most
clearly demonstrated in the Steel Jacks from Canada decision. There
the Commission found a likelihood of injury based upon a
pattern of sales at less than fair value by the Canadian manu-
facturer and his attitude throughout the investigation.... The
evidence shows that the program of selling below fair value was
deliberately undertaken and calculated to obtain by this means
a substantial share of the United States market; ... that the
LTFV sales were continued and indeed accelerated during the
Treasury-Tariff Commission investigation; that opportunity to
adjust prices to eliminate the margin of difference was given by
the Treasury Department and was ignored; that the LTFV sales
are taking an increasing share of the domestic market; and that
the margin of difference was substantial.85
All of these factors led the Commission to find that LTFV sales that
presented no current harm could nonetheless have caused future
injury.
Evidence that the exporter does not harbor a predatory intent, or
will cease his LTFV sales, can usually lead to a finding of no likeli-
hood of injury.8 6 If an exporter gives assurances of reduced exports or
increased prices, the Commission apparently will make a negative
determination of likely injury.87 Such assurances of quantity ceilings
can be compelling. In Standard Household Incandescent Lamps
from Hungary,88 the Commission found no likelihood of injury based
on such assurances despite the fact that the Hungarian exporter
planned a 240 percent increase in production and sales to capitalist
countries.
Market structure factors and general economic realities can also
lead the Commission to a finding of no likelihood of injury; apart
from any indications of restraint on the part of the exporter. In
Acrylic Sheet from Japan,89 the Commission stated, "Structural
factors in the domestic industry indicate that imports will face
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difficulties in capturing a larger share of the domestic market."
Some of the factors of which the Commission took note included the
large scale expansion of domestic production, vertical integration of
raw material supply into the domestic industry's productive pro-
cesses, and the existence of a strong distribution network and
strong product image.9 0 The same reasoning was applied in Buta-
diene Acrylonitrile Rubber from Japan,91 where the Commission
refused to find a likelihood of injury due to market structural factors
such as the "long established relationship" between United States
producers and their major customers and vertical marketing struc-
ture of the complainant companies.
Changing world market and financial conditions may provide suffi-
cient reason for a negative determination of likelihood of injury. In
cases in 1974 and 1975, for example, the Commission mentioned the
decline of the dollar against the yen as a reason to find no likelihood of
injury.92 Given the current weakness of the dollar relative to other
currencies, it may be even more difficult for a United States complain-
ant to demonstrate a future likelihood of injury from LTFV sales.
If the ITC finds actual injury attributable to LTFV sales, it will not
exonerate the exporter on the basis of either a "meeting competition"
or "lack of predatory intent" defense. 93 However, there apparently
are some defenses to a finding of likelihood of injury. For instance, as
has already been noted, a foreign exporter can defend against a find-
ing of likelihood of injury by giving assurances of self-restraint in
future exporting practices and price setting. The exporter may de-
fend on the ground that the likely injury would not in fact be caused
by LTFV sales. And it now appears that the ITC may accept a "sales
promotion" defense to a "likelihood of injury" complaint, although
the Commission has recently been criticized for not allowing such a
defense to a complaint of "actual injury."' For example, in Steel
Wire Strand for Prestressed Concrete from India,95 the complainant
alleged that increased imports from India had captured an increased
share of the United States domestic market. The Commission exam-
ined the effect of the increased imports and found that:
(1) United States production had fallen by 21 percent from
1974 to 1975, and by the end of 1977, had recovered so that
it was only six percent below the peak production year of
1974;
(2) a similar trend occurred in United States producers' ship-
ments;
(3) the ratio of net operating profits to net sales decreased from
a profit of 19 percent in 1975 to a loss of three percent in
1976 and to a further loss of seven percent in 1977;
(4) market penetration increased from 0. 1 percent in 1974 to
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1.8 percent in 1976 and then dropped to 0.8 percent in
1977; and
(5) prices decreased steadily from 1975 through mid-1977.96
Despite these indications of injury, the Commission found that no
injury had been suffered by a United States industry. In arriving at
this decision, the Commission noted:
The principal importer was apparently testing the market with a
new product.., from a new supplier. About one-half of the do-
mestic customers for this wire strand from India were one-time
trial order purchasers, and that importer testified that he has re-
ceived no new orders since mid-1977. The pricing practices thus
constituted a temporary aberration in the market. . . .97
It appears that the Commission did take notice of the importer's
contention that LTFV sales were part of a sales promotion program.
The Commission found that "the [market] impact was clearly not of a
magnitude sufficient to cause injury to the domestic industry."98 Al-
though this case can be distinguished on its facts, it is still clearly
important for those defending a dumping suit. There have been cases
where the Commission has found injury on the basis of smaller de-
grees of import penetration and less significant indicia of market
disruption. It would appear that the importer's ability to demonstrate
its benign intent (through evidence of a sales promotion plan) may
influence the Commission toward a conclusion that the degree of
market disruption does not warrant a determination of injury.
CONCLUSION
To be certain, it is difficult to formulate a concrete and clear stan-
dard of injury on the basis of ITC antidumping decisions. Many
scholars have criticized the ITC for its failure to articulate such a
standard. 99 However, their criticism may be too harsh for several
reasons.
First, an antidumping injury determination is essentially a fact-
finding investigation. The allegations, evidence, and nature of the
dispute are extremely complex. The resolution of the dispute turns
upon the peculiarities of the circumstances surrounding the import
activity. A hard-and-fast standard of injury may preclude considera-
tion of the finer points and lead to undesirable, even harsh, results.
Second, critics tend to look to the judicial process as a model for
antidumping determinations. The apparent lack of precedent in anti-
dumping proceedings makes these critics uncomfortable with the
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present system. Yet almost all administrative proceedings suffer
from the same infirmity since administrative procedure does not em-
brace the concept of stare decisis. Criticism which does not address
this fundamental difference between judicial process and any ad-
ministrative action is unpersuasive.
Moreover, the ITC is a creature of Congress, and to this date, Con-
gress has endorsed the flexible approach taken by the ITC in its
injury determination. 100 With this in mind, perhaps the true focus of
scholarly criticism should be Congress' failure to take the initiative
in defining more clearly the standard of injury to be employed by the
ITC. However, Congress' apparent reluctance to formulate such a
standard through legislative enactment may indicate a desire to
maintain the flexible approach presently used. Given the fluid eco-
nomic and political milieu in which antidumping proceedings occur,
the continued restraint of Congress, as well as the ITC, may promote
the broader economic and political welfare of the United States.
Finally, the degree of consistency that does exist in ITC decisions
should not be ignored. Admittedly, there is more inconsistency than
might be expected if the ITC treated its earlier decisions as prece-
dent, and the inconsistencies reflect the lack of a concrete, clear
standard of injury. Yet a discernible, albeit loose, guideline has been
developed to which the importer, foreign exporter, or United States
complainant can turn to evaluate the potential legal status of a par-
ticular importation. While the specific criteria and degrees of harm
that can be found in past ITC decisions delineate the outer bound-
aries of legal importation activity, a large middle ground remains, in
which an interested party cannot easily determine whether certain
import activity falls within the bounds of the antidumping law.
Although not a predictor, the injury guideline, when used in conjunc-
tion with a frank assessment of economic/political circumstances
surrounding the proposed import and evidence of exporter behavior/
intent, may allow a reasonable estimate of the legality of the import
action in question.
The ITC's flexible approach has two advantages: it may be condu-
cive to the fulfillment of United States trade objectives, which vary
with the identity of the trading partner, and it enables the ITC to
resolve antidumping disputes in a manner that protects United
States domestic business. The articulation of a hard-and-fast rule
could hinder both of these legitimate values.
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